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I. INTRODUCTION
“Rights protected by the First Amendment include advocacy and petition for
redress of grievances, and the Fourteenth Amendment ensures equal justice for the
poor in both criminal and civil actions. But to millions of Americans who are indigent and ignorant . . . these rights are meaningless. They are helpless to assert their
rights under the law without assistance.”
—Justice William Douglas1

People need help. Each year, the legal profession fails to provide more
than 20 million hours of needed legal assistance.2 In fact, close to 75 percent
of low-income and 60 percent of middle-income individuals nationwide suffer
from unmet legal needs each year.3 Describing this alarming disparity, President Jimmy Carter stated, “Ninety percent of our lawyers serve ten percent of
our people. We are overlawyered and underrepresented.”4 Many Americans
cannot afford competent legal services and, as a result, individuals with legal
needs often seek assistance from less capable, but affordable providers or
ignore their need for legal services altogether.5 Nevada is no exception to the
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2011. Special thanks to Professor
Jeffrey Stempel and the Nevada Law Journal staff for their assistance in writing and editing
this Note. I would also like to thank my loving family and my wonderful husband for their
continued support.
1 Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
2 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 241 (1988).
3 Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 712 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism]. Researchers have conducted numerous studies measuring unmet legal needs in
conjunction with efforts to improve access to justice. See ABA COMM’N ON NONLAWYER
PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 45 (1995) [hereinafter ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY] ; see also Kendra Emi
Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996).
4 Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 369, 371 (2004) [hereinafter Rhode, Connecting Principles]. Similarly, in 1983,
Harvard Dean Derek Bok stated that “[t]he legal system . . . is grossly inequitable and inefficient. There is far too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who
cannot.” Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531, 533-34 (1994) (quoting Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice
and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 571 (1983)).
5 Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 8
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15, 56 (1998). Low-income individuals that cannot afford high-cost
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problem of unmet legal needs.6 In 1994, 60 percent of low- and middle-income
Nevadans faced legal problems without access to legal services, and a 2008
survey revealed that Nevadans continued to suffer from limited access to legal
services.7
Defining the practice of law and restructuring prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) through court rules and legislation would dramatically improve access to justice for Nevadans.8 Historically, the legal
profession has used the public’s need for protection as justification for limiting
the practice of law to lawyers,9 but excluding all other providers from the legal
market creates a legal monopoly.10 Currently, Nevada uses a case-by-case
approach that preserves most of the legal services market for lawyers.11 As a
result, Nevada’s current approach fails to acknowledge that nonlawyers can
provide services at a price that low- and middle-income persons can afford,
thus broadening access to justice.12 Nevertheless, Nevada must balance the
public’s need for access to justice against the public’s need for protection from
incompetent service providers.13 Thus, Nevada’s definition of the practice of
law must identify a middle ground that preserves the monopoly only to the
extent it is justified, and permits nonlawyers to serve individuals whose legal
needs have gone unmet for far too long.14
This Note proposes a new definition of the practice of law that properly
balances the public’s need for access to justice against its need for protection
from incompetent legal service providers. Part II explores the historical development of UPL laws and definitions of the practice of law in the United States.
Part III details the arguments made by both proponents and critics of UPL laws.
Part IV scrutinizes approaches to defining the practice of law. Part V proposes
a broad definition of the practice of law with exceptions for legal services that
legal services often ignore their legal problems or eventually resort to low-cost alternatives.
Professor Bertelli analogized the legal services market to the market for used cars, arguing
that low-income consumers will either purchase a “lemon” or do without a car. Id.
6 Nitta, supra note 3, at 912.
7 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 71-72; NEV. SUPREME COURT ACCESS TO
JUSTICE COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN NEVADA
2 (July 2008), http://www.nvbar.org/Committees/LNA%20Assessment%20Final.doc [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N REP.].
8 See Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 407. The Nevada Supreme Court
holds the power to define the practice of law, but rather than adopt a formal definition, the
court has used a case-by-case approach. In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1069, 1071 (Nev.
2008).
9 Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the
Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2593 (1999) (noting that courts
prohibit nonlawyers from providing legal services for ethical reasons, primarily the public’s
need for protection from incompetence).
10 Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or
Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 153 (2000) (referring to the legal
monopoly as a “Legal Cartel”).
11 See In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1069.
12 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 408-09.
13 Id.
14 The ABA has recommended an analytical approach that weighs the consumers’ interest in
access to justice against their need for protection. See ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra
note 3, at 12.
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nonlawyers can competently provide. The definition also includes a regulatory
scheme that protects the public from incompetent legal services. Part VI summarizes Nevada’s next steps toward broadening access to justice.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UPL LAWS
DEFINITIONS

AND

PRACTICE

OF

LAW

Throughout American history, both lawyers and nonlawyers have participated in the legal services market.15 However, the nonlawyer’s role in this
market has changed in response to the degree of regulation and enforcement of
UPL laws.16 During the Colonial period, for example, most courts barred
nonlawyers from representing clients in court,17 but nonlawyers provided a
variety of services that many states today would consider UPL, including drafting legal documents and offering legal advice.18 Nonlawyers experienced
increased freedom during the first century of American history, when state legislatures further liberalized UPL rules to allow nonlawyers to appear in court.19
This freedom continued through the Civil War and the organization of the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1878.20
During the 1920s and 1930s, many states began limiting nonlawyers’ participation in the legal market.21 The Great Depression created new economic
pressure for the legal profession to protect its own interests, which led to
increased regulations of the practice of law.22 States began requiring bar
admission to practice law and imposed criminal sanctions for UPL.23 Also, the
ABA organized its first Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law in
1930, and charged the committee with investigating and enforcing UPL laws.24
Accordingly, the 1930s set in motion a period of increased enforcement of UPL
laws.25
15 Id. at 1. In addition to nonlawyer service providers, consumers themselves participate in
the legal market through self-representation. Cramton, supra note 4, at 566. Thus, the legal
monopoly, even at its peak, had at least one exception: self-representation. Id.
16 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 1.
17 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2583; see also Cramton, supra note 4, at 567. Courts regulated
the practice of law by limiting “who could enter an appearance in litigation.” Id.
18 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2583.
19 Id. Nonlawyer practice flourished during the first 100 years of the new American republic. ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 15.
20 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2582.
21 Susan D. Hoppock, Note, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions: The
Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 721 (2007). “Bar associations, formerly concerned with the two issues
of educational or experience requirements for admission to the bar and prohibiting the
appearance of non-bar members in court, now began to analyze a broader range of nonlawyer activities.” ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 16.
22 Cramton, supra note 4, at 567.
23 Hoppock, supra note 21, at 721-22.
24 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1981) [hereinafter
Rhode, Policing].
25 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 1. From the mid-twentieth century
through the 1970s, the ABA and state bar associations actively enforced UPL laws. Quintin

Fall 2010]

BROADENING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN NEVADA

227

Beginning in the 1940s, the ABA entered into “Statements of Principles”
with other professions.26 These negotiated agreements sought to limit
nonlawyers’ ability to compete with lawyers by prohibiting certain activities as
UPL.27 However, with the rise of antitrust law in the 1970s, consumers began
challenging “Statements of Principles” because the agreements violated antitrust laws.28 In response, the ABA, along with other bar associations,
rescinded all “Statements of Principles,” and the ABA and many state bar
associations disbanded their UPL committees.29
Although most states retained their UPL laws after the antitrust lawsuits,
the 1970s through the 1990s marked an era of confusion and inconsistency.30
Not only did states’ judicial approaches to UPL lack uniformity, enforcement
efforts also significantly declined, thus increasing the occurrence of UPL.31
The ABA responded in 2003 by publishing a Model Definition of the Practice
of Law, recommending that states define the practice of law using the following basic premise as a framework: “[T]he practice of law is the application of
legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or objectives of another person or entity.”32 The ABA also encouraged states to specify who can provide
what services.33
Currently, many states define the practice of law, but the definitions differ
from state to state.34 Regardless, most states agree that the practice of law
includes representing clients in court, preparing legal documents, and giving
legal advice.35 Most definitions contain an exception for self-representation
and some definitions allow nonlawyers to represent clients before state administrative agencies.36 Other states have declined to adopt a definition and
Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Power of State Courts: Difficult Problems
and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 795, 815 (2003).
26 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 9. The ABA and other bar associations entered into
these agreements with “accountants, architects, bankers, claims adjusters, collection agents,
engineers, social workers, law book publishers, realtors, and insurance brokers.” Id. The
parties involved entered into these agreements to avoid litigation, to improve relations
between the professions, and to better serve the public interest. Id.
27 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2584.
28 Cramton, supra note 4, at 567; Denckla, supra note 9, at 2584 (“[T]hese ‘statements of
principles’ were seriously undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar . . . .”). In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court applied antitrust laws to bar associations and reasoned that a state bar association’s position as a state agency does not create an
“antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.” Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791, 793 (1975); see also James Podgers,
Statements of Principles: Are They on the Way Out?, 66 A.B.A. J. 129, 129 (1980).
29 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2584-85.
30 See Hoppock, supra note 21, at 722-23.
31 Johnstone, supra note 25, at 814.
32 ABA TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 13 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/
recomm.pdf [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] .
33 Id. at 5.
34 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005); UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802 (2007);
WASH. GEN. R. 24 (2002); see also Hoppock, supra note 21, at 722.
35 See, e.g., WASH. GEN. R. 24 (2002); Denckla, supra note 9, at 2588.
36 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2588; see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2007) (permitting a certified
public accountant to appear before the Internal Revenue Service).
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instead have resorted to earlier approaches to UPL, such as case-by-case analysis37 or looking to specific conduct that requires the skills and training of a
lawyer.38
III. PROPONENTS

AND

CRITICS

OF

UPL LAWS

Professor Deborah Rhode, a leading scholar in the access-to-justice campaign, commented, “Almost from conception, the unauthorized practice movement has been dominated by the wrong people asking the wrong questions.”39
Players in this debate have characterized the unauthorized practice of law differently.40 Which side people take, whether for or against UPL laws, depends
largely on what questions they ask. For example, someone who asks how can
we protect the public from incompetent services probably supports UPL laws
and believes that only lawyers should provide legal services.41 On the other
hand, someone who asks how can we broaden the public’s access to legal services is most likely a critic of UPL laws and favors nonlawyer participation in
the legal services market.42 Professor Rhode argues that the underlying question should be “whether [incompetency] issues arise with sufficient frequency,
and whether lawyers make so unique a contribution to their resolution, as to
justify a professional monopoly.”43
Importantly, the burden of proof is on the legal profession to justify its
legal monopoly.44 In support of UPL laws, the legal profession presents several justifications for its monopoly, centered around protecting the public.45
Critics of UPL laws respond that the legal profession cloaks its true motive of
suppressing competition in claims of public protection.46 This section explores
37

In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Nev. 2008). The Nevada Supreme Court applied a
case-by-case analysis and failed to adopt a definition for the practice of law as recommended
by the ABA.
38 Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 412-13 (Nev. 1958)
(holding Pioneer Title liable for UPL because some of the services they provided required
the skills and training of an attorney); Hoppock, supra note 21, at 723.
39 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 97.
40 See e.g., Peter S. Margulies, Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practice of Law, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
285, 285-86 (2002); Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 97.
41
See Hoppock, supra note 21, at 728.
42 See generally Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 371-75.
43 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 88.
44 Cramton, supra note 4, at 572 (citing Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 97).
45 See generally Hoppock, supra note 21, at 727-29.
46 See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 448 (2001);
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 697 (Aspen
2009). In 1967, ABA President Orison S. Marden declared that regulation of the practice of
law “must not be motivated by selfishness, by competition-for-competition’s sake, or by
avaricious materialism,” indicating that the ABA recognized the protectionist nature of UPL
laws. Orison S. Marden, The American Bar and Unauthorized Practice, 33 UNAUTHORIZED
PRAC. NEWS 1, 2 (1967). See also LUBAN, supra note 2, at 247 (“The clear conclusion is
that unauthorized practice regulations—state actions—prop up legal fees without serving
any other significant public interest.”).
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the major arguments advanced by proponents of UPL along with the counterarguments made by critics of UPL.
A. Protecting the Public from Incompetent Services
1. Proponents of UPL Laws
Courts, lawyers, and bar associations have defended UPL laws for decades
on the basis that limiting the practice of law to lawyers protects the public from
incompetence.47 “[T]he cost society pays by restricting competition through
licensing is worth the assurance of quality that licensing brings.”48 More specifically, proponents of UPL argue that consumers suffer from “information
asymmetry.”49 Consumers do not have enough information and experience to
evaluate their needs or the quality of the services provided.50
Furthermore, proponents of UPL laws argue that information asymmetry
makes individuals more vulnerable to incompetence:51 “The services rendered
by the professional . . . are necessary to individuals at various points in their
lives and are frequently of the utmost personal concern . . . . Because of the
specialized knowledge involved, the quality of the services rendered . . . is
untestable from the perspective of the layman.”52 Moreover, proponents argue
that consumers in need of legal services are more vulnerable than are other
consumers53 because, in many situations, a lawyer’s authority is self-executing.54 For example, a doctor’s authority depends on the patient acting on the
doctor’s recommendation, whether by taking a pill, exercising once a day, or
getting more rest.55 Alternatively, a lawyer has broader, binding power; a lawyer’s performance can greatly affect the outcome of the legal dispute.56 There47

In re Schwartz, 862 P.2d 215, 218 (Ariz. 1993) (“The purpose of lawyer discipline is not
to punish the offender, but to protect the public, the profession, and the administration of
justice.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2010) (“[L]imiting the practice
of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by
unqualified persons.”); Jonathan Rose, Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Analysis,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 189, 190 (1979) (identifying public protection as the most common
justification for occupational regulation).
48 Soha F. Turfler, Note, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now, When? An
Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1923
(2004).
49 Cramton, supra note 4, at 551; Barton, supra note 46, at 437; Rose, supra note 47, at 191
(discussing lack of sufficient information to evaluate service providers as a justification for
occupational licensing).
50 Barton, supra note 46, at 437-38.
51 Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615 (1986); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 48 (1999).
52 Pepper, supra note 51, at 615.
53 Rose, supra note 47, at 191 (the risk of harm from incorrect decisions is greater in the
legal services market than in other markets); see also Stempel, supra note 51, at 48.
54 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010). Although Rule 1.2(a) requires lawyers to consult with the client regarding the means of carrying out the client’s objections, the
rule also permits lawyers to act on behalf of the client as “impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation.” Id.
55 Stempel, supra note 51, at 49.
56 Id. at 49-50.
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fore, proponents argue that UPL laws provide “an organizing construct that will
maximize the chances that such services will be rendered proficiently.”57
To illustrate this concept of information asymmetry, suppose Bob Jones
and his wife have three children who enjoy jumping on a trampoline in Bob’s
backyard.58 One day, while jumping on the trampoline, a neighborhood child
slips through a gap in the trampoline’s frame where Bob had forgotten to
replace a few missing springs. Sadly, the child breaks her leg, and the child’s
parents blame Bob. A few months later, Bob is served with a summons and
complaint. Bob, like many low-income Americans, faces an average of one
legal problem per year59 and manages them without a lawyer’s assistance by
ignoring his legal problems60 or resorting to self-help.61 Now, Bob is staring at
a frightening legal document that tells him he must answer the complaint within
twenty days.62 Because of his lack of experience with the law, Bob cannot
adequately evaluate his need for an attorney.63 Even if he retains legal counsel,
Bob might not be able to accurately evaluate the quality of services he receives
because he suffers from information asymmetry.64 Bob’s inability to make this
evaluation leaves him vulnerable to incompetent service providers.65 Thus,
according to proponents of UPL laws, the legal profession should step in and
prevent Bob from seeking help from anyone but a lawyer.66
2. Critics of UPL Laws
Critics of UPL laws characterize this rationale as completely unjustified
for two main reasons:67 (1) information asymmetry concerns are minor and
remediable,68 and (2) lawyers are not necessarily more competent than
nonlawyers.69 Regarding the first reason, critics argue that information asymmetry poses a minimal threat to consumers and that individuals can easily remedy information asymmetry.70 Arguably, any consumer in any market
possesses less information about the product or service than does the provider.71 For instance, whenever an interested buyer seeks to purchase shoes
from a manufacturer, presumably the buyer knows less about the quality of the
57

Id. at 50.
Bob Jones’s story is hypothetical.
59 LUBAN, supra note 2, at 241.
60 Bertelli, supra note 5, at 56; see also Turfler, supra note 48, at 1905.
61 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1905.
62 NEV. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1).
63 Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,
49 MD. L. REV. 869, 889 (1990).
64 Id.
65 Pepper, supra note 51, at 615.
66 See Barton, supra note 46, at 436.
67 Barton, supra note 46, at 436 (“This rationale alone cannot justify regulation of
lawyers.”).
68 Id. at 439.
69 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2594.
70 Barton, supra note 46, at 439.
71 See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND
THE PROFESSION 480 (Aspen 4th ed. 2008); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation
of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1267-68 (1995).
58
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shoes than the manufacturer, such as the type of leather used and the method of
production.72 Yet, information asymmetry in the shoe industry does not justify
giving manufacturers a monopoly on the sale of shoes, simply to protect buyers
from low-quality shoes. Nonetheless, lawyers enjoy a monopoly in the name of
protecting consumers from low-quality legal services.73
Critics of UPL laws also contend that any effects of information asymmetry are remediable without prohibiting nonlawyers from providing services.74
Basically, critics argue that the public simply needs more information, not more
regulation.75 A consumer can obtain more information about a legal service
provider by getting a recommendation from family or friends or by researching
the provider.76 States can reduce information asymmetry by reforming rules
that inhibit the free flow of information and by making all client complaints
and discipline related to competency available to the public.77 Thus, critics of
UPL argue that the “‘incompetent lawyer justification’ . . . cannot justify regulation of the legal market as a whole, because the entire market is not affected
by information asymmetry.”78
For critics of the justification that UPL laws are necessary for the protection of the public from incompetence, the second main argument is that lawyers
are not necessarily more competent than nonlawyers.79 Critics point out that
the legal profession attempts to ensure competence by mandating that every
lawyer obtain a legal education, pass a bar exam, comply with professional and
ethical standards, and participate in continuing education courses.80 Unfortunately, these efforts often fail to ensure competence.81 Many law schools fail
to train their law students adequately, bar exams mostly just screen out students
72

Soha F. Turfler drew a similar analogy to orange buyers and fruit suppliers. Turfler,
supra note 48, at 1919.
73 See id. Arguably, the consumer is more vulnerable to serious harm when seeking legal
services than when buying a new pair of shoes. See Stempel, supra note 51, at 49. However, this Note proposes that nonlawyers be permitted to provide routine legal services only,
not services with a high risk of harm to the consumer. Therefore, the shoe industry is analogous to the routine legal services industry. See infra Part V.A-C. Even so, critics of UPL
maintain that information asymmetry in the legal market can be easily remedied. See Barton, supra note 46, at 439.
74 See Barton, supra note 46, at 439.
75 Id. at 446.
76 Id. at 439. See also Cramton, supra note 4, at 571 (proposing that consumer groups and
ratings can remedy information asymmetry). Just as car and electronics consumers use publications such as Consumer Reports as a source of information, Gilson, supra note 63, at
891, legal consumers use rating systems, such as Martindale-Hubbell, to find and evaluate
lawyers. Peer Review Ratings, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, http://www.martindale.com/Products_and_Services/Peer_Review_Ratings.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2010). Consumer
groups could develop similar rating systems to evaluate nonlawyer legal service providers.
77 Barton, supra note 46, at 485.
78 Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted). Barton uses criminal law as an example of
a portion of the legal market more susceptible to information asymmetry. Id. Barton argues
that “[t]he need for regulation based upon consumer protection should thus be understood as
a sliding scale. The more serious and irreversible the potential harm, the greater the justification for regulation to counteract informational asymmetry.” Id.
79 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2594.
80 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 7; Turfler, supra note 48, at 1922.
81 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1925 (“Consumers are no longer ensured intellectually competent services through the use of an attorney.”).
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who do not function well under time pressure, professional and ethical violations often go unpunished, and continuing education classes are not reflective
of the actual legal environment.82 As a result, critics suggest that many nonlawyer specialists are more competent than generalist and inexperienced lawyers.83 For example, after having a default judgment entered against him from
the personal injury case, Bob Jones now needs to file bankruptcy. Bob might
be better off going to a nonlawyer specialist who has thirty years of experience
with bankruptcies than a first-year associate who recently passed the bar on his
fifth try.84 Critics of UPL laws essentially argue that providers can gain competence by means other than a formal legal education.85
Additionally, critics of UPL laws emphasize that little evidence exists to
support the legal profession’s claim that the unauthorized practice of law actually harms the public.86 Many instances of UPL involve no harm to the consumer.87 In fact, only 2 percent of all inquiries, investigations, and complaints
filed with bar associations allege consumer injury.88 Critics highlight these
statistics as evidence that not only do nonlawyers rarely injure consumers, but
the public does not perceive UPL as a danger.89 Some unethical and unqualified nonlawyers do seek to exploit vulnerable consumers, but “the appropriate
response to these problems is regulation, not prohibition.”90
Even assuming that some nonlawyers are less competent than some lawyers, varying degrees in quality do not justify a legal monopoly, according to
critics of UPL laws.91 Virtually every market contains a spectrum of quality in
services and products.92 For instance, anyone who eats out on a regular basis
recognizes that servers vary in quality.93 Yet, states do not regulate servers in
an attempt to weed out the ones who do not have the menu memorized or who
82

Id. at 1925-26; see also Barton, supra note 46, at 449 (noting that bar associations rarely
enforce rules of professional conduct in cases of incompetence, and that CLEs are designed
not to eliminate incompetence, but rather to expand the skills and knowledge of alreadycompetent lawyers).
83 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 408. Although licensing requirements for
lawyers do not ensure competence, these requirements “equip[ ] lawyers with a global perspective not shared by lay practitioners.” Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 88. Lawyers
with professional training are needed to handle complex legal issues, but nonlawyers can
competently provide routine services. See id. Each has a place in the legal services market.
84 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 408.
85 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 7 (“[C]ompetence of nonlawyers providing
services that are included within the definition of the practice of law could be assured, for
instance, through experience, education or training standards, certification or licensing, or
supervision by a lawyer.”).
86 Hoppock, supra note 21, at 725.
87 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 43; see, e.g., In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Nev.
2008). In this case, the client did not allege any harm. Rather, opposing counsel, Progressive Insurance Company, filed the complaint for UPL with the State Bar of Nevada. Id.
88 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 43.
89 Id.
90 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 89-90 (2004) [hereinafter RHODE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE] . See infra Part IV.B.
91 Barton, supra note 46, at 436.
92 Id.
93 Id. (drawing a similar analogy to grocery clerks).
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regularly spill drinks on customers.94 Likewise, critics argue that states should
not limit the practice of law to lawyers simply because nonlawyers might provide lower quality services.95 Although low-quality legal service providers
arguably can cause more harm than a clumsy server, market forces protect consumers by weeding out incompetent providers.96 Consumers would not return
to nonlawyers who performed poorly, thus driving incompetent providers out
of the legal services market.97
B. Protecting the Administration of Justice
Proponents of UPL laws also argue that proper administration of justice
requires that only lawyers provide legal services.98 Stated differently, “[t]he
effectiveness of the legal order in every state is heavily dependent on the state’s
unauthorized practice laws.”99 UPL laws ensure that participants in the judicial
system comply with court rules and standards of professional conduct,100
thereby facilitating efficient and fair operation of the judicial system.101
Critics of UPL laws identify three flaws in the proponents’ argument that
administration of the justice system justifies the legal monopoly.102 First, proponents assume that consumers would hire incompetent nonlawyers, ignorant
of court rules of procedure and conduct.103 In reality, many nonlawyer specialists are more competent than generalist lawyers.104 Nonlawyers can familiarize
themselves with courts rules of procedure and conduct, and states can subject
nonlawyers to the same malpractice liability as lawyers to prevent incompetent
providers from obstructing administration of justice.105 Second, courts possess
inherent power to impose sanctions on nonlawyers for failure to comply with
rules of conduct.106 Third, nonlawyers can adequately provide many routine
services outside of court.107 “[F]or many routine conveyances, retaining coun94

See id. Barton qualifies his statement that varying degrees of competence do not justify
laws by pointing out “a free-market system relies upon a combination of consumer expertise
to choose the best and safest products, and ex post damages actions to control for substandard or dangerous products. When these options fail, ex ante regulation may be justified.”
Id.
95 See id.
96 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1919.
97 Id. Driving incompetent service providers out of the market would protect all consumers,
including those that infrequently seek legal assistance. Although these one-time users lack
enough experience to evaluate the quality of services they receive, having fewer incompetent
providers in the market (a result of free market forces) reduces the risk to one-time users.
98 Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2241, 2259 (1999); see also Robinson v. Jones (In re Robinson), 162 B.R. 319, 325 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1993) (commenting that UPL can hinder the administration of justice).
99 Johnstone, supra note 25, at 795.
100 Hoppock, supra note 21, at 727.
101 Shane L. Goudey, Comment, Too Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: The Unauthorized
Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers, 75 OR. L. REV. 889, 893 (1996).
102 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2597; Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 88.
103 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2597.
104 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 408.
105 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2597.
106 Id.
107 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 88.
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sel may be tantamount to ‘hir[ing] a surgeon to pierce an ear.’”108 Moreover,
if a client does hire a law firm to perform a routine service, a nonlawyer
employee will most likely do the work with little lawyer supervision.109 Therefore, critics of UPL laws maintain that administration of justice concerns cannot justify the legal monopoly.110
C. Preventing Competitive Practice
Another argument for proponents of strict UPL laws is that without such
laws, the legal profession, traditionally a public service profession,111 would
become a competitive business.112 One scholar suggests that if forced to compete, lawyers would “cut ethical corners in search of a buck.”113 Thus, permitting lawyers to compete with one another for clients, similar to other
businesses, would corrupt the profession and harm the clients.114
In response, UPL critics argue that the legal profession is already a business rather than a public service.115 Historically, lawyers were distinguishable
from businesspersons because lawyers were more committed to public interest
than their own financial self-interest.116 Today, however, lawyers behave
much like businesspersons—marketing their services, catering their business to
individuals who can afford it, and striving to increase profits.117 Accordingly,
the legal profession “should be regulated like a business and subject to free
market forces,”118 rather than sheltered from competition by a professional
monopoly.119 Increasing competition within the legal services market would
likely improve quality and lower costs.120
D. Protecting Confidential Information
Lastly, proponents of UPL laws are concerned that allowing nonlawyers to
practice law would fail to protect confidential client information.121 Clients’
private information could be in jeopardy if nonlawyers could practice law,
because nonlawyers and clients do not share a relationship of confidence, such
as the attorney-client privilege.122
108 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Lancaster, Rating Lawyers: If Your Legal Problems
Are Complex, a Clinic May Not Be the Answer, WALL. ST. J., July 31, 1980, at 1, 8).
109 GILLERS, supra note 46, at 697. The client could have saved on legal fees by retaining a
nonlawyer to perform the routine service. Id.
110 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2597-98.
111 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1925.
112 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2598.
113 Pearce, supra note 71, at 1243.
114 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2598.
115 Pearce, supra note 71, at 1232.
116 Id. at 1229.
117 Id. at 1231; Turfler, supra note 48, at 1926.
118 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1927.
119 Id. at 1916.
120 Pearce, supra note 71, at 1232-33.
121 Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and Controlling the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 779-80 (2002).
122 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 90-91.

Fall 2010]

BROADENING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN NEVADA

235

Critics argue that this rationale cannot possibly justify the legal monopoly
because the public’s need for the attorney-client privilege is outweighed by its
need for access to justice.123 In fact, one scholar suggests that few, if any,
consumers have ever filed a complaint for UPL on the grounds of injury from
release of private information.124 In addition, other professions, such as social
workers, accountants, and bankers have access to private information; yet they
still function without the equivalent of an attorney-client privilege.125 Thus,
“the public’s need for such safeguards cannot simply be presumed,”126 nor can
it justify the legal monopoly.
IV. APPROACHES

TO

DEFINING

THE

PRACTICE

OF

LAW

Courts, states, and bar associations have implemented a variety of
approaches to defining the practice of law.127 This section discusses judicial,
regulatory, and statutory approaches, as well as Nevada’s approach to defining
the practice of law.
A. Judicial Approaches to Defining the Practice of Law
State courts have used a number of different approaches to defining the
practice of law. For example, some courts use a “legal knowledge standard,”
under which activities that require the “‘knowledge and the application of legal
principles’ constitute[ ] the practice of law.”128 Other courts define the practice
of law according to a “community-custom” standard, meaning that activities
“‘commonly understood’ to be the practice of law” are limited to lawyers
only.129 Courts sometimes make exceptions for “incidental services,” recognizing that nonlawyers can competently provide certain legal services related to
their specialty.130 Furthermore, some courts implement an “activity-centered”
approach by focusing on what legal services a nonlawyer can competently pro123

See id.
Id. at 91.
125 Id.; see also Bertelli, supra note 5, at 50-51. Limiting the practice of law to lawyers to
protect confidential client information assumes that nonlawyers are less trustworthy than are
lawyers. Id. In actuality, a number of professions successfully protect confidential information, and, thus, are trustworthy. See id.
126 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 91.
127 See generally ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 60-72.
128 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 81; see, e.g., R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d
407, 416 (Okla. 1972) (“Our decisions definitely spell out the concept of the practice of law:
the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interests of another with his consent.”).
129 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 82 (quoting State Bar Ass’n v. Conn. Bank & Trust
Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958); see, e.g., Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb (In re Loeb), 52
N.E.2d 27, 34 (Mass. 1943) (“The actual practices of the community have an important
bearing on the scope of the practice of law.”).
130 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 82; see, e.g., Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d 419,
423 (Ark. 1963) (“[T]he filling in of the simple standardized forms here involved is a necessary incident of [the appellant’s real estate] business.”).
124
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vide.131 This approach “focuses on the nature of the activity rather than the
skills of the layman.”132 Conversely, other courts use an “actor-centered”
approach, defining the practice of law according to who can provide legal
services.133
Yet another judicial approach to defining the practice involves balancing
the public’s need for protection against its need for access to justice.134 This
balancing test creates a sliding scale where only lawyers can provide services
that pose a high risk of harm to the consumer, and nonlawyers can freely provide only those services that pose a low risk of harm.135 Thus, the balancing
approach preserves the legal monopoly when the risk of harm is high, while
allowing nonlawyers to provide low-risk services.136 Compared with other
judicial approaches to defining the practice of law, the balancing test best represents the needs of both the legal profession and the public.137
B. Regulatory Schemes for Nonlawyers
States can further regulate nonlawyer activity within the legal market in
three ways: registration, certification, and licensing.138 Under these regimes,
nonlawyers range from minimally qualified to formally educated, thus ensuring
that nonlawyers’ participation in the legal services market is commensurate
with their abilities.139
131

Turfler, supra note 48, at 1955; see, e.g., Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Mo.
1952) (“[G]eneral warranty deed and trust deed forms are so standardized that to complete
them for usual transactions requires only ordinary intelligence rather than legal training.”).
132 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 83 (criticizing the activity-centered approach as overinclusive because it permits an activity without regard to the actor’s ability, but the approach
might also be under-inclusive by omitting activities that certain nonlawyers can perform
competently). See also Turfler, supra note 48, at 1955.
133 See Turfler, supra note 48, at 1952 (referring to the actor-centered approach as the “lawyer-centered perspective”); see, e.g., Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433
N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn. 1988) (“The line between what is and what is not the practice of
law cannot be drawn with precision. Lawyers should be the first to recognize that between
the two there is a region wherein much of what lawyers do every day in their practice may
also be done by others without wrongful invasion of the lawyers’ field.”). The actor-centered approach would have the inverse affect of the activity-centered approach. Focusing on
the actor might be over-inclusive because not all activities performed by an actor should be
allowed. Additionally, the actor-centered approach would be under-inclusive because some
omitted actors might be competent to provide legal services. Johnstone, supra note 25, at
797 (noting that UPL laws must define whom can provide what services). The ABA also
makes the whom/what distinction. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 5.
134 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 83-84; see, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass’n, 312 P.2d 998, 1007 (Colo. 1957) (“[R]equiring all [real estate] transactions to be conducted through lawyers, would not be in the public interest; . . . the advantages, if any, to be derived by such limitation are outweighed by the conveniences now
enjoyed by the public in being permitted to choose whether their broker or their lawyer shall
do the acts or render the service . . . .”).
135 Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 714-15; see also ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY,
supra note 3, at 12; Barton, supra note 46, at 441.
136 Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 714-15.
137 See Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 84-85.
138 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 145-46.
139 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 6.
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Registration is the least restrictive method of regulation.140 Specifically,
registration involves nonlawyers filing their names, addresses, and qualifications with a state agency, and agreeing to comply with certain standards of
conduct.141 The register then provides the state with a list of all legal service
providers, enabling the state to watch over registrants’ activities.142
Certification, like registration, requires nonlawyers to register with a state
agency, but nonlawyers must demonstrate certain qualifications to receive a
specific occupational title.143 Titles may include “Certified Legal Assistant” or
“Certified Paralegal.”144 Although certification is voluntary145 and cannot
guarantee ongoing competence,146 the public benefits from the opportunity to
choose between certified and uncertified providers.147 Additionally, certified
providers may charge a higher fee.148 Yet, because uncertified providers may
still compete in the market, their lower fees serve as a check on the higher
prices charged by certified providers.149 On the other hand, certification
schemes might require states to develop exams, which makes this method more
expensive than registration.150
Licensing is the most restrictive of the regulatory schemes.151 Similar to
registration and certification, licensing involves registering with a state agency
to receive an occupational title, but licensees must prove their competency
through testing.152 The standards are typically much higher for licensing than
certification.153 The legal profession requires that law school graduates obtain
licenses to become lawyers, but some states also offer limited licensing for
nonlawyers.154 Because licensing requires standardized testing and policing of
unlicensed providers, however, it remains the most expensive method of state
regulation.155
C. Statutory Approaches to Defining the Practice of Law
Many states define the practice of law by statute or court rule. This section discusses the scope of these definitions and highlights three states’ definitions as examples of the varied statutory approaches to defining the practice of
law.
140

Julie A. Flaming, Note, Avoiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Proposed Regulations for Paralegals in South Carolina, 53 S.C. L. REV. 487, 501 (2002).
141 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 145.
142 Id. at 146.
143 Id. at 145.
144 Flaming, supra note 140, at 501; ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 146.
145 Flaming, supra note 140, at 501.
146 Barton, supra note 46, at 447.
147 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 147.
148 Barton, supra note 46, at 447.
149 Id.
150 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 147.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 146.
153 Id. at 147.
154 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(1) (2002).
155 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 147.
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1. Scope of Definitions of the Practice of Law
Commentators often refer to statutory definitions of the practice of law
according to their scope: broad, narrow, or subject to the free market.156 However, none of these definitions alone satisfy the competing interests of the legal
profession and the public.
Broad definitions of the practice of law encompass most, if not all, legal
services, leaving little to nothing for nonlawyers to offer.157 Thus, a broad
definition includes heavy regulation on the practice of law.158 The ABA proposed a broad definition in 2003, which recommended that each state define the
practice of law using the following basic premise: “[T]he practice of law is the
application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or objectives
of another person or entity.”159 Many states have recognized this broad premise, including Nevada.160 However, this broad definition on its own severely
restricts the public’s access to justice because disallowing nonlawyer participation in the legal services market drives up prices.161 Consumers who cannot
afford a lawyer have little or no access to justice.162
The free-market definition of the practice of law repeals all UPL laws,
allowing the free market to control the services and providers for which the
public is willing to pay.163 Free-market advocates argue that the legal monopoly has not only failed to perpetuate respect for lawyers and the law,164 but also
that the legal profession fails to adequately meet the needs of the public.165
Therefore, the legal market should be subject to free market forces like most
other businesses.166 However, without a definition of the practice of law, consumers would be vulnerable to abuse by service providers.167 Although protecting consumers from incompetence alone cannot justify the legal monopoly,
the need for some protection from scammers and inept providers remains.168
156

Turfler, supra note 48, at 1917. Professor Pearce discusses a range of approaches similar to the broad and free market definitions, but he refers to them as the “status quo” and the
“pure market approach.” Pearce, supra note 71, at 1232, 1269-70. Ultimately, Professor
Pearce proposes a “hybrid approach” similar to this Note’s proposed definition. Id. at 1270.
157 GILLERS, supra note 46, at 690; see also Turfler, supra note 48, at 1924.
158 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1921.
159 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 13.
160 See, e.g., In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1072 (Nev. 2008); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 81.101(a) (West 2005); UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(b)(1) (2010); WASH. GEN. R. 24(a)
(2002).
161 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1932.
162 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 373.
163 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1924.
164 DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
3-4 (2000) (“About three-fifths of Americans describe attorneys as greedy, and between half
and three-quarters believe that they charge excessive fees. There is even broader agreement
that lawyers handle many matters that could be resolved as well and with less expense by
nonlawyers.”); Turfler, supra note 48, at 1925 (arguing that UPL laws have failed to promote respect for the legal profession).
165 Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 712.
166 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1927.
167 See Stempel, supra note 51, at 48-50.
168 Barton, supra note 46, at 441. Some unlicensed providers misrepresent themselves as
licensed attorneys in order to exploit consumers, particularly low-income immigrants.
Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 408. Professor Rhode suggests the solution
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Accordingly, the free market definition does not sufficiently balance the profession’s interests against the public’s interests.
A narrow definition of the practice of law reserves a small portion of the
legal services market for lawyers and leaves the rest open to nonlawyers.169
Lawyers would still enjoy exclusive power over complex legal services, but
nonlawyers could perform all routine and simple services.170 However, a narrow definition alone cannot meet the needs of both the profession and the public. Although narrow definitions allow for increased competition and reduced
prices,171 states should still regulate nonlawyer providers to maintain legal
order and ensure professional and competent performance.172
2. Specific States’ Approaches to Defining the Practice of Law
Although states have implemented a wide variety of approaches and definitions for the practice of law,173 this section focuses on Texas, Washington,
and Utah. These states represent a broad spectrum of approaches, and this Note
incorporates certain features from each one into its proposed definition for
Nevada.
a. Texas
The Texas UPL statute, Texas Government Code § 81.101, contains a narrow definition with exceptions, and authorizes the case-by-case approach.174
is not prohibition, but rather regulation of nonlawyers in the legal services market. Id. Justice Douglas agreed, stating that “[c]ertainly the States have a strong interest in preventing
legally untrained shysters who pose as attorneys from milking the public for pecuniary gain.
But it is arguable whether this policy should support prohibitions against charitable efforts of
nonlawyers to help the poor. . . . [L]ay assistance may be the only hope for achieving equal
justice at this time.” Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 151-52 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
169 GILLERS, supra note 46, at 690; Turfler, supra note 48, at 1929.
170 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1932-33.
171 Id. at 1932.
172 Hoppock, supra note 21, at 728.
173 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2009); see also ABA TASK FORCE ON
THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW: STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW app. a, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_statutes.pdf.
This Appendix demonstrates the variety of state approaches and definitions for the practice
of law. See id. However, the Appendix lists Utah’s 2003 definition, rather than its current
edition enacted in 2005; therefore, the list is not an accurate list of all current state
definitions.
174 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005). The Texas UPL statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) In this chapter the “practice of law” means the preparation of a pleading or other document
incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on
behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court, including the
giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge,
such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts
and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
(b) The definition in this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of the
power and authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated cases to determine whether other
services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of law.
(c) In this chapter, the “practice of law” does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale, including publication, distribution, display, or sale by means of an
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The statute enumerates three activities that qualify as the practice of law: preparing legal documents, representing clients in court, and giving legal
advice.175 The Texas statute also lists the services and products not designated
as the practice of law, and, in effect, authorizes nonlawyers to provide these
services and products.176 Although the statute allows nonlawyers to provide
written and electronic products to consumers, such as books, forms, and computer software, these products must disclose that they are not substitutes for the
advice of an attorney.177 Courts may add to both the list of activities that constitute the practice of law and the list of exceptions on a case-by-case basis.178
b. Washington
Washington’s UPL rule, Washington General Rule 24, includes a broad
definition of the practice of law and a series of exceptions.179 The rule defines
Internet web site, of written materials, books, forms, computer software, or similar products if
the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice
of an attorney. This subsection does not authorize the use of the products or similar media in
violation of Chapter 83 and does not affect the applicability or enforceability of that chapter.
175

Id. § 81.101(a). Most states agree that these three activities constitute the practice of
law. Denckla, supra note 9, at 2588.
176 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(c).
177 Id. Prior to enactment of this statute, the Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee aggressively enforced UPL laws against providers of legal self-help materials. Fischer,
supra note 10, at 131-34. But, just as one scholar predicted, Texas reformed its UPL statute
to allow self-help materials, focusing on the consumer’s need, rather than protecting the
legal profession. Id. at 134.
178 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(b).
179 WASH. GEN. R. 24 (2002). The Washington UPL rule reads in pertinent part:
(a) General Definition: The practice of law is the application of legal principles and judgment
with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another entity or person(s) which require the
knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) Giving advice or counsel to others as to their legal rights or the legal rights or responsibilities of others for fees or other consideration.
(2) Selection, drafting, or completion of legal documents or agreements which affect the
legal rights of an entity or person(s).
(3) Representation of another entity or person(s) in a court, or in a formal administrative
adjudicative proceeding or other formal dispute resolution process or in an administrative
adjudicative proceeding in which legal pleadings are filed or a record is established as the
basis for judicial review.
(4) Negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of another entity or person(s).
(b) Exceptions and Exclusions: Whether or not they constitute the practice of law, the following
are permitted:
(1) Practicing law authorized by a limited license to practice pursuant to Admission to Practice Rules 8 (special admission for: a particular purpose or action; indigent representation;
educational purposes; emeritus membership; house counsel), 9 (legal interns), 12 (limited
practice for closing officers), or 14 (limited practice for foreign law consultants).
(2) Serving as a court house facilitator pursuant to court rule.
(3) Acting as a lay representative authorized by administrative agencies or tribunals.
(4) Serving in a neutral capacity as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, or facilitator.
(5) Participation in labor negotiations, arbitrations or conciliations arising under collective
bargaining rights or agreements.
(6) Providing assistance to another to complete a form provided by a court for protection
under RCW chapters 10.14 (harassment) or 26.50 (domestic violence prevention) when no
fee is charged to do so.
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the practice of law as the “application of legal principles and judgment . . . to
the circumstances or objectives of another entity or person(s).”180 Washington’s rule lists the same three activities as Texas’ statute—preparing documents, representing clients in court, and giving legal advice181—but subsection
24(a)(4) adds negotiating for a client to the list of activities that constitute the
practice of law.182
The rule also contains exceptions for certain providers and services that
would otherwise qualify as UPL under subsection (a).183 More specifically,
Washington permits the following providers and services: (1) potential limited
licensees who may practice law although they are not licensed lawyers;184 (2)
nonlawyers that represent clients before an administrative agency;185 and (3)
the sale of legal forms by nonlawyers, such as fill-in-the-blank divorce papers
and wills.186 Like Texas, Washington also authorizes a case-by-case approach
to determining UPL.187
c. Utah
Utah’s UPL rule, Utah Supreme Court Rule 14-802, takes a form very
similar to Washington’s statute. It includes a broad definition and “carve-outs”
or exceptions for nonlawyers to provide certain services that would otherwise
qualify as UPL.188 Similar to the statute in Texas and the rule in Washington,
(7) Acting as a legislative lobbyist.
(8) Sale of legal forms in any format.
(9) Activities which are preempted by Federal law.
(10) Serving in a neutral capacity as a clerk or court employee providing information to the
public pursuant to Supreme Court Order.
(11) Such other activities that the Supreme Court has determined by published opinion do
not constitute the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law or that have been permitted
under a regulatory system established by the Supreme Court.
180

WASH. GEN. R. 24(a). The Nevada Supreme Court articulated an almost identical definition in Lerner—“the application of the general body of legal knowledge to a client’s specific
problem.” In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1072 (Nev. 2008). The ABA also proposes this
definition as a basic premise for defining the practice of law. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 32, at 13.
181 WASH. GEN. R. 24(a)(1)-(3); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(a).
182 WASH. GEN. R. 24(a)(4).
183 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b).
184 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(1). Rule 24(b)(1) authorizes “certain lay persons to select, prepare
and complete legal documents incident to the closing of real estate and personal property
transactions.” WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 12(a) (2009).
185 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(3). Many states permit nonlawyers to practice before an administrative agency. Denckla, supra note 9, at 2588.
186 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(8). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that routine transactions
should not require a lawyer’s assistance. In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1072 (Nev. 2008);
Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 410 (Nev. 1958).
187 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(11); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(b) (West 2005).
188 Gary G. Sackett, An Analytic Approach to Defining the “Practice of Law”—Utah’s New
Definition, 18 UTAH B. J. 12, 16 (2005); UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802 (2010). Utah’s UPL
statute reads in pertinent part:
(b)(1) The “practice of law” is the representation of the interests of another person by informing,
counseling, advising, assisting, advocating for or drafting documents for that person through
application of the law and associated legal principles to that person’s facts and
circumstances. . . .
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Utah’s rule defines the practice of law broadly as the “application of the law
. . . to [another] person’s facts and circumstances.”189 The rule goes on to list
permitted activities by nonlawyers,190 notably adding clarity by listing the
actors and activities together.191 For instance, a real estate agent can prepare
real estate sales agreements, and a certified public accountant may prepare tax
returns.192 This method clearly draws “[t]he line that marks the area into which
the layman may not step except at his peril.”193
However, Utah has an interesting history in defining the practice of
law.194 In 2003, the Utah Legislature adopted an extremely narrow definition,
limiting the practice of law to representation in court.195 As a result, everything outside of the courthouse was fair game for nonlawyers and lawyers
alike.196 The legislation did not take effect for one year, suggesting that the
(c) Whether or not it constitutes the practice of law, the following activity by a non-lawyer, who
is not otherwise claiming to be a lawyer or to be able to practice law, is permitted:
(1) Making legal forms available to the general public, whether by sale or otherwise, or
publishing legal self-help information by print or electronic media.
(2) Providing general legal information, opinions or recommendations about possible legal
rights, remedies, defenses, procedures, options or strategies, but not specific advice related to
another person’s facts or circumstances.
(3) Providing clerical assistance to another to complete a form provided by a municipal,
state, or federal court located in the State of Utah when no fee is charged to do so. . . .
(8) Acting as a representative before administrative tribunals or agencies as authorized by
tribunal or agency rule or practice. . . .
(12) Advising or preparing documents for others in the following described circumstances
and by the following described persons:
(A) a real estate agent or broker licensed by the state of Utah may complete Stateapproved forms including sales and associated contracts directly related to the sale of
real estate and personal property for their customers.
(B) an abstractor or title insurance agent licensed by the state of Utah may issue real
estate title opinions and title reports and prepare deeds for customers.
(C) financial institutions and securities brokers and dealers licensed by Utah may
inform customers with respect to their options for titles of securities, bank accounts,
annuities and other investments.
(D) insurance companies and agents licensed by the state of Utah may recommend
coverage, inform customers with respect to their options for titling of ownership of
insurance and annuity contracts, the naming of beneficiaries, and the adjustment of
claims under the company’s insurance coverage outside of litigation.
(E) health care providers may provide clerical assistance to patients in completing and
executing durable powers of attorney for health care and natural death declarations
when no fee is charged to do so.
(F) Certified Public Accountants, enrolled IRS agents, public accountants, public
bookkeepers, and tax preparers may prepare tax returns.
189

UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(b)(1); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(a); WASH. GEN. R.
24(a).
190 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(1)-(12).
191 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(A)-(F).
192 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(A), (F).
193 Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 150 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194 Sackett, supra note 188, at 12-16.
195 Sackett, supra note 188, at 12-13; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-9-102 (2003) (repealed 2004).
Courts used a similar definition—limiting the practice of law to representation in court
only—during the Colonial period. Denckla, supra note 9, at 2583. Thus, Utah’s definition
was, for a time, radically different from the definitions in most other states.
196 See Sackett, supra note 188, at 13.
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legislature wanted to send a message rebuking the legal profession for being
“too parochial and over-protective of its professional turf.”197 The narrow definition compelled the Utah Supreme Court to formulate a definition of the practice of law,198 which it did by promulgating the current rule in 2005.199
D. Nevada’s Approach to Defining the Practice of Law
Nevada’s approach to defining the practice of law has evolved over the
last fifty years, but because Nevada has not adopted a bright-line rule, Nevada’s
approach fails to address the public’s need for access to justice.200 In 1958, the
Nevada Supreme Court first considered defining the practice of law in Pioneer
Title Ins. & Trust v. State Bar of Nevada.201 The Court held Pioneer Title
liable for the unauthorized practice of law, and in doing so, made several
important statements regarding the practice of law.202 First, the court stated
that the purpose of Nevada’s UPL statute was “not the protection of the lawyer
against lay competition but the protection of the public.”203 Second, the court
defined the practice of law by looking for conduct that required the skills and
training of a lawyer.204 Third, with the public’s interest in mind, the court
carved out an exception from its broad definition for services that qualify as
public necessities, such as investment, insurance, and tax accounting.205
Subsequently, the Nevada Supreme Court struggled to apply the definition
and public necessity exceptions it had laid out in Pioneer Title.206 In Greenwell v. State Bar of Nevada, the appellant claimed that its typing service business qualified as a public necessity under Pioneer Title.207 The Court declined
to extend the public necessity exception to the appellant’s conduct,208 but it did
recognize that the record lacked evidence relating to the availability of legal
assistance for low- and middle-income Nevada residents.209 Accordingly, the
court ordered the State Bar of Nevada to conduct an investigation, and if the
197

Id. at 12, 13.
Id. at 13. A state’s highest court traditionally regulates the practice of law. ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 135. In fact, the separation of powers doctrine requires
that the legislature and executive refrain from interfering when the judiciary exercises its
regulatory powers. Id. However, in many states, the legislature also enacts UPL laws and
the executive branch enforces those laws. Id. at 136.
199 Sackett, supra note 188, at 14.
200 Compare Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 412 (Nev.
1958) (defining the practice of law by looking for specific conduct that requires the skills
and training of a lawyer), with In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Nev. 2008) (applying a
case-by-case approach to defining the practice of law).
201 Pioneer Title, 326 P.2d at 408; In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1071 (noting that Pioneer Title
represents the only other time the court considered defining the practice of law).
202 Pioneer Title, 326 P.2d at 413.
203 Id. at 409.
204 Id. at 412. The Court identified evaluating the legal sufficiency of a document as an
activity that requires the skills and training of a lawyer. Id.
205 Id.
206 See Greenwell v. State Bar of Nev., 836 P.2d 70, 71 (Nev. 1992).
207 Id. At the time, typing services often helped customers fill out legal forms related to
bankruptcy, divorce, and estate planning. Nitta, supra note 3, at 912 n.16.
208 Greenwell, 836 P.2d at 71.
209 Id.
198
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investigation confirmed the “alleged unavailability of legal services for low and
middle-income Nevadans,” the Court instructed the Bar to draft rules that
would allow nonlawyers to provide simple legal services to the meet the needs
of the community.210
In response to the court’s order in Greenwell and in an effort to broaden
access to justice, the State Bar of Nevada appointed a commission to conduct a
survey of legal needs in Nevada.211 The survey concluded that 60 percent of
low- and middle-income Nevadans had legal problems and no available assistance.212 Although 26.4 percent of underserved Nevadans resorted to self-representation, 25.8 percent of Nevadans could not afford a lawyer or believed that
a lawyer could not help them.213 Rather than proposing rules that would allow
nonlawyers to participate in the legal market, as the Supreme Court had
instructed, the State Bar of Nevada responded to these statistics by proposing
stricter UPL laws and mandatory pro bono.214 The State Bar of Nevada later
withdrew the petition after bar members expressed opposition to the mandatory
pro bono requirement.215 Even so, the Board of Governors voted that “providing legal services to the poor” should be its “number one priority.”216
In 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court took an important step toward broadening access to justice in Nevada by creating the Access to Justice Commission.217 The Court charged the Commission with assessing legal needs in
Nevada and developing new policies to improve access to justice.218 In 2008,
the Commission conducted a statewide survey of Nevada’s civil legal needs.219
The Commission also meets four times a year to discuss and implement new
strategies for improving the delivery of legal services in Nevada.220 Yet, the
Commission, the court, and the Nevada State Bar have ignored one important
210 Id. The court failed to define what it meant by “simple legal services.” This Note
suggests they are those services that a nonlawyer can competently provide. See infra Part
V.C.
211 Jasmine K. Mehta, Reflections on My Year as Chair, NEV. LAW., July 2008, at 44, 44;
Nitta, supra note 3, at 917.
212 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 71-72.
213 Id. at 72.
214 Id. The State Bar of Nevada proposed adding civil penalties to the state’s UPL statutes
and a 20-hour-per-year pro bono requirement (or a contribution of $500) for every member
of the Nevada Bar. Id. Currently, pro bono work remains voluntary. NEV. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1(a) (2006) (“A lawyer should aspire to render at least 20 hours of pro
bono publico legal services per year.”).
215 Nitta, supra note 3, at 917.
216 Id.
217 Order Creating the Nevada Supreme Court Access to Justice Commission and Adopting
Rule 15 of the Supreme Court Rules (2006), available at http://www.nvbar.org/Committees/
Enabling%20order.pdf.
218 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 15(1)(a)-(b).
219 ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N REP., supra note 7, at 1; Carri Geer Thevenot, Need for
Legal Aid Outstrips Supply, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 20, 2009, at 1B (recognizing the
Access to Justice Commission’s 2008 assessment of legal needs in Nevada, which spurred
fundraising campaigns to provide legal assistance to low-income Nevadans).
220 Supreme Court of Nevada Access to Justice Commission, ST. B. NEVADA, http://www.nv
bar.org/Committees/AccessToJusticeCommittee.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2010). The
Nevada Supreme Court requires the Commission to meet at least semi-annually. NEV. SUP.
CT. R. 15(3).
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option for improving access to justice for Nevadans: redefining the practice of
law to allow the contributions of nonlawyers.221
Nevada’s UPL rule, promulgated by the Nevada Supreme Court, fails to
define nonlawyers’ roles in Nevada’s legal market.222 The rule prohibits (1)
lawyers not licensed in Nevada from practicing in Nevada, and (2) lawyers
from assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law.223 Although the rule
makes certain exceptions for lawyers licensed in a jurisdiction other than
Nevada, it makes no exceptions for nonlawyers to perform simple legal services.224 Additionally, the rule does not include a clear definition for the practice of law.
In 2008, with no working definition of the practice of law, the Nevada
Supreme Court resorted to applying a case-by-case approach.225 In the case of
In re Lerner, the court held attorney Glen Lerner liable for assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law.226 Although not licensed in Nevada, an associate
at Lerner’s Las Vegas office represented clients in Nevada, thereby violating
Nevada’s UPL law.227 Lerner was liable for assisting in UPL because the associate’s misconduct was consistent with firm policy.228
The Nevada Supreme Court possesses the “inherent power to define the
practice of law.”229 Yet in both Pioneer and Lerner, the court outlined an
approach to defining the practice of law without actually articulating a definition.230 In Lerner, the court engaged in a thoughtful discussion of the policies
behind defining the practice of law.231 Like proponents of UPL laws,232 the
court identified “the overarching reason for requiring that only lawyers engage
in the practice of law: to ensure that the public is served by those who have
demonstrated training and competence and who are subject to regulation and
discipline.”233 However, the court recognized the need for an exception for
routine services, as it had previously suggested in Pioneer.234 It articulated the
221 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 72. The Bar’s petition did not propose
changing UPL laws to allow nonlawyers to provide simple legal services, as the Nevada
Supreme Court advised. Greenwell v. State Bar of Nev., 836 P.2d 70, 71 (Nev. 1992).
222 See NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2006).
223 NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)(1)-(2).
224 NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b).
225 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Nev. 2008).
226 Id. at 1071.
227 Id. at 1070; NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)(1).
228 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1071; NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)(2).
229 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1071. Because the Nevada Supreme Court holds this power,
the court is ultimately responsible for defining the practice of law for Nevada. David Luban
concluded, “The state has not been an innocent bystander observing the regrettable spectacle
of economic inequality and poverty: it shares primary responsibility with the legal profession
(and its well-off clients) for the fact that the poor have no meaningful access to justice and
are made worse off by that fact.” LUBAN, supra note 2, at 247-48.
230 See Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 412 (Nev. 1958)
(defining the practice of law by looking for specific conduct that requires the skills and
training of a lawyer); see also In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1069 (applying a case-by-case
approach to defining the practice of law).
231 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1072-74.
232 Barton, supra note 46, at 436.
233 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1072.
234 Id.
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following basic premise: the practice of law is the “application of the general
body of legal knowledge to a client’s specific problem.”235 Unfortunately, the
court went on to reject a bright-line rule for the practice of law, opting instead
for a case-by-case analysis.236 Lastly, the court articulated the same lofty goal
as the State Bar of Nevada: making public interest the state’s number one
priority.237
As illustrated, Nevada’s current approach fails to properly balance both
the public’s and the legal profession’s interests in defining the practice of law.
Therefore, if Nevada truly wants to meet the needs of its residents, Nevada
needs a new approach and definition that combine the best elements from all
the above approaches and definitions.
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH

AND

DEFINITION

OF THE

PRACTICE

OF

LAW

Nevada’s number one priority in defining the practice of law should be
underserved Nevadans. This idea is nothing new. In 1995, the State Bar of
Nevada set this same priority at a Board of Governors meeting;238 the Nevada
Supreme Court discussed this same goal in 2008.239 However, despite this
widely accepted priority, access to justice for low-income Nevadans remains
severely restricted.240 Now is Nevada’s chance to reach its goal by making the
public a priority, increasing access to justice, and restraining the legal monopoly. The Nevada Supreme Court, with its inherent authority to define the practice of law,241 should work together with the Access to Justice Committee, the
legal community, other professions, and the public to implement a new definition of the practice of law.
A. The Need for a Definition of the Practice of Law in Nevada
Nevada’s current case-by-case approach fails to live up to Nevada’s goal
to make the public the number one priority in defining the practice of law. One
scholar characterized the case-by-case approach as, “I know it when I see
it.”242 Supporters of the case-by-case approach argue that it is the only worka235

Id.; see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 13.
In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1073.
237 Id. In 1995, the State Bar of Nevada set “providing legal services to the poor” as its
“number one priority.” Nitta, supra note 3, at 917.
238 Nitta, supra note 3, at 917.
239 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1073.
240 In the mid 1990s, at least 60 percent of low- and middle-income Nevadans had unmet
legal needs. ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 71-72. In 2008, the Access to
Justice Commission’s survey revealed that Nevadans continue to suffer from inadequate
delivery of legal services. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N REP., supra note 7, at 2.
241 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1071. If the Nevada Supreme Court permits the State Bar of
Nevada to define the practice of law, reform in the public’s best interests is unlikely because
the Bar has a financial interest in limiting the practice of law to lawyers. CRYSTAL, supra
note 71, at 482.
242 Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance:
MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business After Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 762 (2002). The “I
know it when I see it” approach became well known and widely criticized after Justice
Stewart used the phrase to describe obscene materials unprotected by the First Amendment.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
236

Fall 2010]

BROADENING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN NEVADA

247

ble option in a constantly changing market.243 However, the opposite is actually true. The changing legal market makes future methods of service delivery
unpredictable;244 thus, a clear, yet amendable, definition of the practice of law
would add necessary stability and means for enforcement.
Added stability would improve compliance and enforcement of UPL laws.
Indeed, noncompliance with UPL laws is rampant,245 and enforcement of UPL
laws is lacking.246 Both unfortunate conditions result from ambiguous UPL
laws.247 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas stated in 1967, “The line that
marks the area into which the layman may not step except at his peril is not
clear.”248 The same is true today.249 Without a clear definition of the practice
of law, nonlawyers do not know what they can and cannot do, state bars do not
know what, or whom, to prosecute, and courts do not know what conduct to
punish.250 Nevada needs to define the practice of law.251
B. A Proposed Approach to Defining the Practice of Law
The best approach, proposed by numerous scholars and the ABA, balances
the public’s need for protection against its need for access to justice.252
Although the public needs protection from incompetence, states can resolve
these concerns by subjecting nonlawyers to standards of conduct, malpractice
liability, and regulatory schemes.253 In such a system, the public’s need for
access to justice outweighs, but does not eliminate, its need for protection. For
each legal service, the balancing test weighs the risk of harm against the need
for access.254 Notably, the Nevada Supreme Court articulated the need for
such balancing: “In determining what constitutes the practice of law, the public
interest should be of primary concern—both protection of the public from
incompetent legal services and also ensuring that regulation of the practice of
law is not so strict that the public good suffers.”255
C. A Proposed Definition of the Practice of Law
The Nevada Supreme Court recently articulated a broad definition of the
practice of law: “the application of the general body of legal knowledge to a
client’s specific problem.”256 Nevada can avoid radical reform of its UPL laws
243

Keatinge, supra note 242, at 762.
See id. at 717.
245 Johnstone, supra note 25, at 815.
246 Hoppock, supra note 21, at 720.
247 Johnstone, supra note 25, at 814-15.
248 Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 150 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
249 See Johnstone, supra note 25, at 808-09.
250 See id.
251 Soha Turfler made a similar declaration more generally to all states: “The time has come
to formulate a model definition of the practice of law: If the time is not now, then when?”
Turfler, supra note 48, at 1959.
252 Id.; Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 714-15; ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY,
supra note 3, at 12; ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 5.
253 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 409.
254 Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 714-15.
255 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1073 (Nev. 2008).
256 Id. at 1072.
244
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by using this broad definition257 as the foundation for its new definition. A
broad definition is preferable to a narrow definition because a narrow definition
indirectly defines the practice of law. Essentially, a narrow definition attempts
to define services that courts must consider the unauthorized practice of law,
because only a lawyer can adequately provide the service.258 But defining the
practice of law inversely—by defining what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law—skirts the real issue.259 Nevada should define the practice of law
directly to include most legal services, erring on the side of protecting the
public.260
To broaden access to justice, Nevada must also provide exceptions to the
broad definition for simple legal services that nonlawyers can competently provide.261 Most states with broad definitions provide exceptions for nonlawyers.262 Nevada could enumerate these exceptions in the definition itself or add
exceptions later through case law, statutes, court rules, or agency regulations.263 Because of this flexibility, a broad definition with exceptions allows
the definition to persist through changing market conditions.264 Meanwhile,
Nevada can modify these exceptions if previously complex legal services
become routine.265
In determining which exceptions to make for nonlawyers, the court should
consider exceptions made by other states, as well as transactions commonly
accepted as routine. In order to avoid a definition that is both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive, Nevada should refrain from both activity-centered and
actor-centered approaches.266 Instead, Nevada’s definition of the practice of
law should list exempted actors and their corresponding exempted activities.267
The definition should list activities only when the activity, regardless of the
actor, is routine. Likewise, the definition should list actors that, regardless of
the activity, are completely competent.268
The following is a list of proposed exemptions:
1. Real estate brokers and agents may draft real estate agreements.269
257

Id.
Turfler, supra note 48, at 1958.
259 Denckla, supra note 9, at 2592.
260 In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1073.
261 See id. at 1072.
262 Quintin Johnstone, Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws and Some Options for
Their Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 303, 334 (2004).
263 Id. at 334-35.
264 Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 410 (Nev. 1958)
(“[T]he public becomes accustomed to certain areas of transaction and . . . as transactions in
those areas become standardized, legal counselling [sic] is no longer generally regarded as a
practical necessity . . . .”).
265 Id.
266 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(A)-(F) (2007).
268 See, e.g., UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(1)-(11).
269 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(A). Many professionals routinely deliver services that
would technically violate a broad definition for the practice of law, including real estate
brokers, insurance agents, and financial advisors. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note
90, at 87. Additionally, under many states’ broad definitions, these professionals could not
function without engaging in prohibited activities. Id. Nevada’s definition for the practice
258
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2. Title insurance agents may prepare title opinions, title reports, and
deeds.270
3. Financial institutions may advise customers on investments.271
4. Insurance agents may advise customers on beneficiaries and claims.272
5. Accountants may prepare tax returns and give tax advice.273
Exemptions that should qualify as routine services, regardless of the actor,
include:
1. Selling legal forms.274
2. Providing general legal information.275
3. Assisting with filling out legal forms.276
A new definition that allows certain nonlawyers to provide certain legal
services also calls for a regulatory scheme.277 Registration, as the least restrictive option, requires minimal administrative cost.278 Existing state agencies
can register nonlawyers and then combine each roster to create a list of providers.279 The State Bar of Nevada could then use the list to enhance its current
efforts to monitor nonlawyer activity in the legal market.
of law should formally recognize nonlawyers that the public already informally recognizes
as competent providers of legal services.
270 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(B). The majority of commentators agree that requiring
a lawyer to perform title searches would be a waste of the lawyer’s skills and resources.
Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 88.
271 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(C).
272 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(D).
273 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(12)(F). Tax accountants are trained to interpret the Internal
Revenue Code, a complex statute. GILLERS, supra note 46, at 690. Thus, accountants
should be permitted to prepare tax returns and give tax advice.
274 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(8) (2002); UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(1); Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193-94 (Fla. 1978) (holding that nonlawyers may sell sample legal
forms because such forms can be standardized and can assist individuals who choose to
represent themselves).
275 UTAH SUP. CT. R. 14-802(c)(2); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(c) (West 2005).
Nonlawyers can assist pro se litigants by providing general legal information. RHODE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 81-82. On January 14, 2010, Clark County, with the
help of the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, opened the Civil Law Self-Help Center
inside the Regional Justice Center in downtown Las Vegas. Civil Law Self-Help Center
Grand Opening and Ribbon Cutting, CLARK COUNTY CTS, http://www.clarkcountycourts.us/
media/features/Civil-Law-Ribbon-Cutting.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2010). A similar selfhelp center, also in Las Vegas, is located at the Family Courthouse. Self-Help Centers,
CLARK COUNTY CTS, http://www.clarkcountycourts.us/self-help.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2010). Because Nevada already recognizes the role legal information plays in providing pro
se litigants with access to justice, nonlawyers should be permitted to aid these efforts.
276 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(6); Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d at 1194 (holding that
nonlawyers may help clients fill out legal forms, but nonlawyers may not give advice on how
best to fill out the forms).
277 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 145-46.
278 Flaming, supra note 140, at 501.
279 See ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 146. The Nevada Department of
Business and Industry regulates Nevada businesses. Welcome to the State of Nevada Business & Industry, NEV. DEPARTMENT BUS. & INDUSTRY, http://business.nv.gov/default.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010). Additionally, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, under the
direction of the Attorney General and Consumer Advocate, enforces consumer-protection
statutes. Consumer Protection, NEV. ATT’Y GEN., http://ag.state.nv.us/org/bcp/bcp.htm (last
visited Dec. 15, 2010).
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Certification would allow well-qualified nonlawyers to distinguish themselves from uncertified providers.280 Also, certification provides the consumer
with more information about the provider, thus reducing information asymmetry.281 Nevada can implement a certification process by setting minimum
experience and training standards and could choose to create certification
exams.282 The process should not be too cumbersome, as effective certification
procedures currently in use can serve as templates for developing additional
programs.283
Lastly, Nevada may choose to develop a specialty-licensing scheme for
nonlawyers.284 The ABA encourages states to offer specialty certification to
lawyers;285 likewise, Nevada could offer specialty licenses to nonlawyers who
can demonstrate the requisite knowledge and experience.286 More specifically,
the ABA’s Model Plan for specialty certification for lawyers requires that an
applicant demonstrate four qualifications: (1) knowledge and competence
through an exam; (2) substantial involvement in the specialty area; (3) continuing education coursework; and (4) peer reviews from other professionals familiar with the applicant’s work in that area of specialty.287
These same four qualifications for lawyer specialists could apply to nonlawyer specialists. Similar to certification programs, licensees could distinguish themselves from other nonlawyers, and more importantly, from certified
nonlawyers.288 As a result, a specialty-licensing program would add another
level of competence to the continuum, ranging from a formally educated lawyer
to a minimally qualified nonlawyer provider.289 This additional level of competence would create more competition in the market and, thus, more competitive prices.290 The increased competition would also provide the consumer
with more information about the service provider, further reducing information
asymmetry.291 Nonlawyers already licensed in Nevada should continue to provide legal services within their specialty areas.292
Nevada can further protect the public from incompetence, without sacrificing access to services, by setting competency and professional standards for
280

ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 145-46.
See Barton, supra note 46, at 485 (suggesting that states can reduce information asymmetry by providing more information to the consumer).
282 See ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 147.
283 To minimize administrative costs of implementing a new definition for the practice of
law, Nevada should utilize the programs it already has in place. See Rhode, Connecting
Principles, supra note 4, at 409 (states should incorporate existing licensing programs for
nonlawyer specialists into their UPL regulatory schemes).
284 See WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(1) (2002) (authorizing a limited licensing scheme for
nonlawyers). See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
285 Judith Kilpatrick, Specialist Certification for Lawyers: What Is Going On?, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 273, 305 (1997). Similarly, the medical profession offers specialty certification. Id.
286 See id.
287 Id. at 296-302.
288 See ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 146-47.
289 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 6.
290 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1932 (noting that increased competition reduces prices).
291 See Barton, supra note 46, at 485 (suggesting that states can reduce information asymmetry by providing more information to the consumer).
292 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 409.
281
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nonlawyers.293 The State could impose these standards through the regulatory
schemes.294 For instance, when nonlawyers register to become legal services
providers, they must agree to comply with certain standards of conduct.295
Nevada could choose to increase the standards of conduct for certified providers and expect even more from licensed specialists. Furthermore, Nevada
could subject all legal service providers to malpractice liability.296 It might
even require that all providers comply with rules of professional responsibility,
such as maintaining confidentiality and avoiding conflicts of interest.297
D. Benefits of the Proposed Approach and Definition
This proposed approach and definition successfully resolves concerns for
both the public’s protection and the public’s access to justice.298 The leading
benefit of this proposal is that defining the practice of law in Nevada will
broaden access to justice by confining the legal monopoly to a smaller and
justified portion of the market.299 Despite the flaws of the legal monopoly,
public interest requires that high-risk services be limited to lawyers.300 This
proposed definition preserves business for lawyers, and, thus, the legal monopoly, to the extent that formal knowledge and training is necessary to perform
the legal service. In the past, the State Bar of Nevada unsuccessfully proposed
mandatory pro bono work to increase availability of legal services to the
poor.301 Fortunately, Nevada can still meet this goal by enabling nonlawyers to
fill in the gaps and satisfy unmet legal needs of Nevada’s residents.302
New regulatory schemes will provide additional levels of competence and
consumer choice to the legal services market, forcing lawyers to compete on
quality and price.303 The table below illustrates how competition between lawyers and nonlawyers possessing similar levels of competence leads to more
competitive pricing for consumers. The table also demonstrates how each service provider fits into the legal services market.

293

Turfler, supra note 48, at 1927.
Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 409.
295 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 145.
296 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 409; Turfler, supra note 48, at 1927.
297 Rhode, Connecting Principles, supra note 4, at 409. This resolves the concern posed by
proponents of UPL laws that permitting nonlawyers to provide legal services would fail to
protect clients’ confidential information. Hoppock, supra note 21, at 729.
298 See Turfler, supra note 48, at 1959.
299 Id. at 1933, 1947.
300 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1958.
301 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 72.
302 Id. at 71.
303 Fischer, supra note 10, at 144.
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Competence

Cost

Lawyer

High

High

Nonlawyer Specialist

High

Moderate

Lawyer

Moderate

Moderate-High

Certified Nonlawyer

Moderate

Moderate-Low

Lawyer

Low

Low-Moderate

Registered Nonlawyer

Low

Low

Unauthorized Nonlawyer

Low

Low

This proposal will also increase efficiency for non-profit organizations in
the delivery of legal services to low- and middle-income Nevadans. For
instance, legal aid programs struggle to serve the public because their lawyers
are overworked.304 Authorizing nonlawyers to perform a broader range of services “would allow a publicly funded legal aid program to be run much more
cheaply and efficiently.”305 Paralegals could fill positions formerly held by
lawyers, and “lawyers would be utilized more efficiently and intelligently if
routine matters were diverted away from them.”306
In addition, this proposal would allow the free market to promote
increased competency.307 “[G]overnment intervention to protect consumers is
only necessary when the market fails to perform that function.”308 Here, market forces protect consumers by weeding out incompetent providers.309 More
specifically, consumers will not return to nonlawyers or lawyers who perform
poorly, thus driving incompetent providers out of the legal services market.310
This proposed definition regulates the practice of law only to the extent necessary to protect consumers, while allowing the market to encourage competency
from nonlawyers and lawyers.
In the end, competition created by nonlawyers would benefit both the public and the legal profession. The public would benefit from more consumer
choice,311 lower costs,312 and increased efficiency.313 The legal profession
would benefit from deregulation of nonlawyers in two primary ways. First,
limiting the legal monopoly and permitting nonlawyers to perform routine services would assure the public that the legal profession is regulating the practice
304 See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 270. Lynn Etkins, development director for the Legal Aid
Center of Southern Nevada, recently stated, “We just turn away so many people because we
don’t have the capacity or resources to help them.“ Thevenot, supra note 219, at 1B.
305 LUBAN, supra note 2, at 270; see also Trippe S. Fried, Licensing Lawyers in the Modern
Economy, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 51, 55 (2008) (discussing how increased regulation leads to
decreased transactional efficiency).
306 LUBAN, supra note 2, at 270.
307 See Turfler, supra note 48, at 1919.
308 Rose, supra note 47, at 190.
309 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1919. The free market can retrospectively weed out incompetent nonlawyers, but Nevada needs a regulatory scheme to weed out incompetent nonlawyers
before they harm consumers. See supra notes 277-97 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
311 See Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 3, at 713.
312 LUBAN, supra note 2, at 270.
313 Turfler, supra note 48, at 1908.
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of law with the public’s interest in mind, thereby restoring trust in the legal
profession.314 Second, in the name of efficiency, lawyers performing routine
work can choose to refer clients to nonlawyer providers, leaving more time for
professionally challenging work that commands a higher fee.315 Therefore, this
proposed definition broadens access to justice for Nevadans while also addressing the concerns of the legal profession, nonlawyer providers, and the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas declared that for millions of
Americans, the right to equal justice is “meaningless” without legal assistance.316 Sadly, the legal profession restrains access to justice for the majority
of low- and middle-income Nevadans.317 But Nevada can change this reality.
By defining the practice of law, lawyers and nonlawyers together can assist
underserved Nevadans. More specifically, Nevada must adopt a broad definition of the practice of law that includes exceptions for certain nonlawyers to
perform certain routine services. This portion of the definition broadens access
to justice. While doing so, however, Nevada must balance the public’s need for
access against its need for protection. The definition must include regulatory
schemes, such as registration, certification, and specialty licensing, as well as
standards of competence and professionalism. These features, taken together,
will create a definition of the practice of law that can persist through a changing
market and benefit the public, nonlawyers, and the legal profession alike.

314 Rhode, Policing, supra note 24, at 98-99. “Non-lawyer participation [in the disciplinary
process] provides assurance to the public that the disciplinary system is serving its interests,
rather than those of individual lawyers.” Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 939 (1994).
Similarly, nonlawyer participation in the legal services market would assure the public that
the legal profession is regulating the practice of law with the public’s interest in mind.
315 See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 270-71.
316 Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 144-46 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
317 ABA, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 71-72.

